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C00002 00002 In the case of a specific known machine, one can often give a
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In the case of a specific known machine, one can often give a
%2first order structural definition%1. Thus we might give a
predicate %2B(s,p)%1 such that if the machine is in state %2s%1, it
is said to believe the sentence %2p%1 provided %2B(s,p)%1 is true.
However, I don't think there is a general definition of belief having
this form that applies to all machines in all environments.
Therefore we give a %2second order predicate%1 β%2(B,W)%1 that
tells whether we regard the first order predicate %2B(s,p)%1 as a
"good" notion of belief in the %2world W%1. Such a predicate β will
be called a %2second order definition%1; it gives criteria for
criticizing an ascription of a quality to a system.
Axiomatizations of belief give rise to second order
definitions, and we suggest that both our common sense and scientific
usage of not-directly-observable qualities corresponds more closely
to second order structural definition than to any kind of behavioral
definition. It should be noted that a second order definition
cannot guarantee that there exist predicates %2B%1 meeting the
criterion β or that such a %2B%1 is unique. It can also turn out
that a quality is best defined as a member of a group of related
qualities.
The second order definition criticizes whole belief
structures rather than individual beliefs. We can treat individual
beliefs by saying that a system believes %2p%1 in state %2s%1
provided all "reasonably good" %2B%1's satisfy %2B(s,p)%1. Thus we
are distinguishing the "intersection" of the reasonably good %2B%1's.